Interference is said to be present when the exposure or treatment received by one individual may affect the outcomes of other individuals. Such interference can arise in settings in which the outcomes of the various individuals come about through social interactions. When interference is present, causal inference is rendered considerably more complex, and the literature on causal inference in the presence of interference has just recently begun to develop. In this article we summarise some of the concepts and results from the existing literature and extend that literature in considering new results for finite sample inference, new inverse probability weighting estimators in the presence of interference and new causal estimands of interest.
Introduction
Interference is said to be present when the exposure or treatment received by one individual may affect the outcomes of other individuals. Such interference can arise in settings in which the outcomes of the various individuals come about through social interactions. 1, 2 Most of the literature on causal inference proceeds by making an assumption of 'no-interference'. For example, Rubin's formulation of the potential outcomes framework an assumption referred to as the 'Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption' or 'SUTVA' is made which includes within it a no-interference assumption. 3 Such no-interference assumptions are employed routinely though not always acknowledged. Often such no-interference assumptions are unrealistic.
Examples in which interference and spillover effects are present abound. Sobel, 4 for example, considers a context in which individuals are randomised to receive a voucher to move to a new neighbourhood and notes that the departure of individuals from a neighbourhood may affect the outcomes of those who do not, or who are not randomised to move. Hong and Raudenbush 5 consider an education setting in which some low-achieving children are retained rather than promoted at the end of the year; the decision to retain a child will affect not only the child's outcomes but also the outcomes of other children at the school. Hudgens and Halloran 6 consider different vaccine allocation programmes; in this context, whether or not one individual receive a vaccine may affect whether other individuals in the same community are infected. In all of these contexts interference is present; an assumption of no-interference would not be reasonable. Sobel 4 notes that ignoring such interference can give rise to particularly misleading inferences: a researcher in a randomised housing experiment that ignored interference might conclude that a move to a more prosperous neighbourhood is beneficial even in circumstances in which it is universally harmful (both for those moving and for those remaining). Interference is not simply a problem that needs to be addressed but in fact gives rise to new causal quantities of interest. In many of these contexts considered above, the spillover effects that result from the influence of one individual's treatment on another's outcome are of intrinsic interest; these spillover effects cannot be analysed without taking interference into account.
When interference is present, causal inference is rendered considerably more complex. It was noted by Rubin 7 that potential outcomes notation could accommodate interference. Halloran and Struchiner 8 attempted to address causal inference under interference in an infectious disease context using a more informal approach. It is only very recently, however, that the literature on causal inference in the presence of interference began to develop formally 2, [4] [5] [6] 9, 10 . In this article, we hope to both summarise some of the concepts and results from the existing literature and to extend that literature in considering new results for finite sample inference, new inverse probability weighting estimators in the presence of interference and new causal estimands of interest.
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. In Section 2, we present the notation we will be using throughout. In Section 3, we review notions of direct, indirect (spillover), total and overall causal effects of Hudgens and Halloran 6 that arise when interference is present. In Section 4, we discuss inference for these effects in randomised trials and present new results on variance estimation and finite sample confidence intervals in the presence of interference. In Section 5, we consider the context of observational studies and present a result on inverse probability weighting estimators of causal effects when interference is present. In Section 6, we discuss varieties of direct and indirect effects present in the causal inference literature and comment on the terminological ambiguity concerning the expressions 'direct effect' and 'indirect effect'; we also discuss a new causal estimand that indicates a non-zero 'infectiousness effect' in the context of vaccine trials. 11, 12 Finally, in section 7, we offer some concluding remarks and directions for future research.
Preliminaries 2.1 Counterfactuals
As in Hudgens and Halloran, 6 suppose data is observed on N > 1 groups of individuals, or blocks of units. For i ¼ 1, . . . , N, let n i denote the number of individuals in group i and let A i (A i1 , . . . , A in i ) denote the treatments those n i individuals received. Throughout, we assume perfect compliance, that is treatment assigned to an individual is equivalent to treatment received by the individual. We assume that A ij is a dichotomous random variable with support equal to {0, 1}, so that A i takes values in the set {0,
. A in i ) denote the n i À 1 subvector of A i with the jth entry deleted. Following Halloran and Struchiner, 8 Hudgens and Halloran 6 and Sobel, 4 we refer to A i as an intervention, treatment or allocation programme, to distinguish it from the individual treatment A ij . Furthermore, for n ¼ 1, 2, . . . , we define A(n) as the set of vectors of possible treatment allocations of length n; for instance A(2) {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}. Therefore, A i takes one of 2 n i possible values in A(n i ), while A i,Àj takes values in A(n i À 1) for all j. For positive integers n and k, we further define A(n, k) to be the subset of A(n) wherein exactly k individuals receive treatment 1, that is every element a of A(n, k) satisfies 1 T n a ¼ k, where 1 n is the vector of length n with entries all equal to one.
For each block i, we shall assume there exist counterfactual (potential outcome) data
is individual j 0 s response under treatment allocation a i ; and that the observed outcome Y ij for individual j in block i is equal to his counterfactual outcome Y ij (A i ) under the realised treatment allocation A i . The notation Y ij (a i ) makes explicit the possibility for interference between individuals within a block, that is, the potential outcome for individual j may depend on another's individual treatment assignment in block i. Also, note that for counterfactuals to remain well defined, this notation implicitly assumes that counterfactuals for an individual in block i do not depend on treatment assignments of individuals in a different block i 0 6 ¼ i. This encodes the assumption of partial interference considered by Sobel 4 and Hudgens and Halloran, 6 which they point out to be particularly appropriate when the observed blocks are well separated by space or time such as in some group randomised studies in the social sciences, or in some community-randomised vaccine trials. The ordinary no interference assumption 3, 13 generally made in the causal inference literature is then that for all i and j if a i and a 0 i are such that
, which in turn implies that the counterfactual outcomes for individual j in group i can be written as {Y ij (a) : a ¼ 0, 1}.
Hereafter, until otherwise stated, we follow the convention in Sobel 4 and Hudgens and Halloran, 6 and suppose that Y i (Á) is fixed as it does not depend on the random treatment allocation programme A i . In addition to treatment and outcome data, we suppose that we also observe fixed data
where L ij denotes pretreatment covariates for individual j in block i; we allow L ij to contain block level covariate along with block aggregates of individual level covariates.
Treatment assignment in group randomised experiments
In group randomised experiments, treatment allocation is determined by the experimenter; therefore the assignment mechanism n i (A i ) of A i is known. Let n i (A i ; 0 ) denote an experimenter's particular choice of parametrisation for the distribution of A i indexed by the parameter 0 , that is n i (A i ) ¼ n i (A i ; 0 ). In this article, we consider two types of parametrisations.
Definition (A) A parametrisation of type A with parameter 0 ¼ {n i , K 0,i : i} for blocks i ¼ 1, . . . , N, entails a so-called mixed individual group assignment strategy, whereby the treatment programme A i in block i is randomly allocated conditional on 1 T n A i ¼ P n i j¼1 A ij ¼ K 0,i with probability mass function:
A parametrisation of type B entails a Bernoulli individual group assignment strategy, whereby treatment is randomly assigned to different individuals within block i according to the known probability mass function:
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For example, two type A treatment assignment strategies 0 and 1 ¼ {n i , K 1,i : i} might entail randomly assigning half of n i individuals in group i to treatment 1 and the other half to treatment 0 under a strategy corresponding to 0 versus assigning all individuals in a group to treatment zero under the second strategy corresponding to 1 . Similarly, two treatment assignment strategies Ã 0 and Ã 1 of the second type might assign each individual in a group to treatment 1 with probability 1/2 under strategy Ã 0 versus assigning each individual in a group to treatment 0 with probability 1/3 under strategy Ã 1 : Sobel 4 and Hudgens and Halloran 6 considered Type A treatment allocation programmes in group randomised trials; in Section 5, we show that allocation programmes of type (B) play an important conceptual role in the definition and estimation of causal effects in observational studies.
Suppose our goal is to assess the causal effects of assigning groups to 0 , compared to 1 , where 0 and 1 are two individual group assignment strategies of type A. To achieve this goal in an experimental study, Hudgens and Halloran 6 considered the following two-stage group randomisation framework. In the first stage, each of the N groups is randomly assigned to either 0 or 1 . In the second stage individuals within a group are randomly assigned to treatment conditional on their group's assignment in the first stage. For instance, in the first stage, half of the N groups might be assigned to an allocation strategy 0 while the other half is assigned to 1 ; in the second stage, two-thirds of the individuals within groups assigned 0 are randomly assigned to treatment 1, while one-third of the individuals within a group assigned to 1 receive treatment 1. Such a design is commonly known as split-plot randomisation or pseudo-cluster randomisation. As Hudgens and Halloran 6 point out, two-stage randomisation designs are key to obtaining answers for important public health questions in the face of interference, such as: how many cases due to an infectious disease will be averted by vaccinating two-thirds of the population compared to only vaccinating one-third of the population? 
and as in Hudgens and Halloran, 6 the individual average direct causal effect for individual j in group i by:
where similar to Sobel, 4 for a ¼ 0, 1,
Note that in the above display, and until stated otherwise, n i (Á; 0 ) may either be of Type A or B. Thus, DE ij 0 ð Þ is a difference in individual average counterfactual outcomes when a ij ¼ 0 and when a ij ¼ 1 under 0 . This is a marginal causal effect as it is a comparison between expected values of the marginal distributions of Y ij (A i,Àj , a ij ¼ 0) and of Y ij (A i,Àj , a ij ¼ 1) with respect to 0 . Finally, we define the group average direct causal effect by DE i 0 ð Þ ¼ P n i j¼1 DE ij 0 ð Þ=n i and the population average direct causal effect by DE 0 ð Þ ¼ P N i¼1 DE i ð 0 Þ=N:
Indirect causal effects or 'spillover effects'
Halloran and Struchiner 8 also define an individual indirect causal effect as the causal effect on an individual of the treatment received by others in the group. Specifically, let IE ij ða i,Àj , a 0 i,Àj Þ be the individual indirect causal effect on subject j in group i of treatment allocation a i compared with a 0 i , so that:
Sobel 4 refers to the indirect effect defined above as a 'spillover effect.' Note that if interference is absent then IE ij ða i,Àj , a 0 i,Àj Þ ¼ 0. Similar to direct effects, define the individual average indirect causal effect by IE ij ð 0 , 1 Þ ¼ Y ij 0; 0 ð ÞÀY ij 0; 1 ð Þ: Finally, define the group average indirect causal effect as IE i ð 0 , 1 Þ ¼ P n i j¼1 IE ij ð 0 , 1 Þ=n i and the population average indirect causal effect as
Total causal effects
Total effects reflect both the direct and the indirect effects of a particular treatment assignment on an individual. Following Halloran and Struchiner 8 we define the individual total causal effects for individual j in group i as:
the individual average total causal effect by TE ij ð 0 , 1 Þ ¼ Y ij 0; 0 ð ÞÀY ij 1; 1 ð Þ, the group average total causal effect by TE i ð 0 , 1 Þ ¼ P n i j¼1 TE ij ð 0 , 1 Þ=n i and the population average total causal effect by TEð 0 , 1 Þ ¼ P N i¼1 TE i ð 0 , 1 Þ=N:
Overall causal effects
Following Hudgens and Halloran, 6 we define the individual overall causal effect of treatment a i compared to treatment a 0 i for individual j in group i by:
Similarly, define the individual average overall causal effect comparing 0 to 1 by
and Y ij 1 ð Þ is analogously defined. The group average overall causal effect by OE i ð 0 , 1 Þ ¼ P n i j¼1 OE ij ð 0 , 1 Þ=n i and the population average overall effect by OEð 0 , 1 Þ ¼
The following simple yet instructive properties describe the relationship between the various causal effects:
(1) It follows immediately from their definitions, that total effects at the individual, group or population levels can be decomposed as the sum of direct and indirect causal effects at the corresponding level. That is, for example TEð 0 , 1 Þ ¼ DE 1 ð Þ þ IEð 0 , 1 Þ. 6 (2) Total causal effects are not commutative, for instance TEð 0 , 1 Þ 6 ¼ TEð 1 , 0 Þ: However,
so that while the total causal effects are not necessarily equal, they are constrained in sum to equal the sum of direct effects. 6 (
In the absence of indirect effects, the total effects are commutative if and only if the direct effects are equal. 6 Under the assumption of no interference between individuals of a group, the individual indirect causal effect is equal to zero and therefore individual, group and population average causal total effects are equal to the average causal direct effects at the corresponding level. Recall that in the absence of interference, the counterfactual outcomes for individual j in group i can be written as {Y ij (a) : a ¼ 0, 1} and the individual and group average causal effect become Y ij (1) À Y ij (0) and
Furthermore, the assumption of no interference implies that the various causal effects do not depend on the treatment assignment strategies 0 and 1 , whereas in the presence of interference within groups, these effects do in general depend on the assignment strategies.
4 Inference in two-stage randomised studies
Estimation
In this section, we consider the estimation of the following key causal contrasts, the population average direct causal effect DE 0 ð Þ, the population average indirect causal effect IEð 0 , 1 Þ, the population average total causal effect TEð 0 , 1 Þ and the population average overall causal effect OEð 0 , 1 Þ. Unbiased estimators of these parameters under a two-stage randomisation scheme were proposed by Hudgens and Halloran 6 under the following assumption:
Assumption 1 Let S (S 1 , . . . , S N ) denote the first stage of randomisation group assignments with S i ¼ 1 if group i is assigned to 0 and zero if group i is assigned to 1 . Let denote the parametrisation for the distribution of S and let C ¼ P i S i denote the number of groups assigned 0 . Then, {, 0 , 1 } are assumed to be Type A parametrisations.
Hudgens and Halloran 6 proposed the following estimators:
which they showed to be unbiased under Assumption 1, that is:
where the expectation is taken with respect to the joint density of (S, A 1 , . . . , A N ).
Variance estimation 4.2.1 Variance estimation under stratified interference
Unbiased estimation of the variances of the various estimators of the Section 4.1 appears not to be generally available without an additional assumption regarding the underlying structure of interference. Hudgens and Halloran 6 illustrate this difficulty by considering the estimation of Lemma 1 Suppose that Y ij (a i ) ! 0 for all a i 2 A(n i , K 0,i ) and for j ¼ 1, . . . , n i , and define d
, then the following holds under Assumption 1:
The proof of this lemma is given in the appendix.
In contrast with Lemma 1 Hudgens and Halloran 6 consider variance estimators that rely on the following assumption of stratified interference.
for all a i , a 0 i 2 Aðn i , kÞ, such that a ij ¼ a 0 ij : Assumption 2 states that a i } Y ij (a i ) is a function of a i only through ða ij , P j 0 6 ¼j a ij 0 Þ, that is an individual's counterfactual outcome only depends on his exposure level a ij , and on the total number of people exposed in his group. Let Y ij (a ij ; 0 ) Y ij (a ij , a i,Àj ; 0 ) for any a i,Àj 2 A(n i À 1, K i À a ij ), a ij ¼ 0, 1; and let:
Hudgens and Halloran 6 proved that under Assumptions 1 and 2:
That is the variance estimators (6)-(9) are generally conservative. However, as they show for Equation (10), equality holds if and only if:
for fixed constant D,i , for j ¼ 1, . . . , n i and i ¼ 1, . . . , N, which is equivalent to an additive individual direct causal effect across all groups. Note that when Y ij (A i ) is binary, and 0 5 jDE 0 ð Þj5 1, then the hypothesis of additive direct treatment effects cannot generally hold as the only values of DE 0 ð Þ consistent with additivity are 0, 1 and À1. Hudgens and Halloran 6 also establish analogous conditions under which equality holds for each of the other Equations (11)- (13) .
Despite the availability under Assumptions 1 and 2, of reasonable variance estimators given by Equations (6)-(9) for the various estimators of causal effects proposed by Hudgens and Halloran, 6 a formal framework for statistical inference on population average causal effects is currently lacking. As a remedy, in the following section, we develop a finite sample framework for making causal inferences in this context of interference.
Finite sample inference for a binary outcome 4.3.1 Motivation of our approach
We construct finite sample confidence intervals for the four population average causal effects of interest. To simplify the exposition, we mainly focus on the case of a binary outcome. We motivate the approach by first considering the following more familiar goal of obtaining a 95% confidence interval for a proportion 0 ¼ Pr(H ¼ 1), using an available sample of i.i.d Bernoulli data H 1 , . . . , H n . In this simple setting, a finite sample approach is based on the following exponential inequality for i.i.d data due to Hoeffding: 14 Pr jb À 0 j 4
The above display implies that by choosing a large enough value Ã n of so that 2exp{À2n *2 } 0.05, the interval:
satisfies Pr{ 0 2 C n } ! 0.95, and therefore C n is a 95% confidence interval of 0 at each n. It is easy to verify that the smallest such value Ã n is given by 1:35= ffiffi ffi n p . Note that the exponential bound of Equation (15) offers a marked improvement over that of Chebyshev's inequality:
which yields the much wider confidence interval C Ã n ¼ b À 2:23 ffiffi n p , b þ 2:23 ffiffi n p . Nonetheless, the confidence interval C n is rarely used in practice when n is moderate to large, and is given here to motivate our approach. This is because for n large enough, C n is generally more conservative than more standard confidence intervals of 0 . To be specific, for moderate to large values of n, the common confidence interval for 0 based on a standard normal approximation has length no larger than 2= ffiffi ffi n p , which is less than 3/4 the length of C n . In contrast with the above simple Bernoulli case, to the best of our knowledge there currently exists no method, whether finite or large sample-based, to construct a confidence interval for any of the causal parameters considered in Section 4.2.1. Thus, to construct a finite sample confidence interval for say DE 0 ð Þ, we proceed as above, and develop a Hoeffding-type exponential inequality for the tail probability Pr d DE 0 ð Þ À DE 0 ð Þ 4 n o of the absolute difference:
However, whereas the terms of the sum b ¼ P i Y i =n in Equation (15) are iid, the terms of the sum in Equation (16) are not independent under type A parametrisation, since Cov(S i , S j ) 6 ¼ 0 for all i 6 ¼ j. Thus, Hoeffding's exponential inequality for sums of independent data no longer applies. However, in a technical report, we show that d DE 0 ð Þ À DE 0 ð Þ admits an alternative representation as the average of a sum of a martingale and of so-called negatively associated random variables for which tail probability bounds are derived. 15 
New confidence intervals
As in the Bernoulli case illustrated above, we use our Hoeffding-type exponential inequality to obtain the desired finite sample confidence intervals. In fact, we prove that:
Theorem 1 For any level 2 (0, 1), the interval:
According to the theorem, for each value of (q, N, ), the coverage probability PrfDE 0 ð Þ 2 C DE , 0 , q, N ð Þ gis guaranteed under Assumption 1 to be no smaller than 95%, with the length of C DE (, 0 , q, N) proportional to 1 N 1=2 , so that for a fixed value of (, q), C DE (, 0 , q, N) becomes increasingly precise as the number of groups in the study grows. However, we note that C DE (, 0 , q, N) may not be particularly useful when N is small, for those values of (, q) such that Ã DE , 0 , q, N ð Þ!2: This is because in such a case, the corresponding confidence interval is noninformative, as it contains the entire range of possible values of DE 0 (, q, N) is guaranteed to be non-informative for values of N 9. As evident from the proof of the theorem, the term 4 1 q À 1 2 in Equation (17) is an upper bound for the squared absolute deviation of the conditional average direct effect
This bound increases as q decreases towards zero, a situation which can arise in a study where the proportion of groups randomised to the treatment allocation 0 is very small, that is when C is small relative to N. This will invariably result in an increase in uncertainty in our inferences on DE 0 ð Þ. However, we note that more accurate inferences may still be possible for the population conditional average causal direct effect which we define as:
and which corresponds to the average causal direct effect for the population of groups actually randomised to 0 . The next theorem provides a finite sample confidence interval for DE c 0 ð Þ:
Theorem 2 For any level 2 (0, 1), the interval
Note that both C DE (, 0 , q, N) and C DE c (, 0 , q, N) are centred around the same estimator d DE 0 ð Þ, which is unbiased for DE 0 ð Þ and is conditionally unbiased for DE c 0 ð Þ: However, the length of the second confidence interval no longer includes the term 4 1 q À 1 2 and thus will often be substantially shorter. The following theorem provides a finite sample confidence interval for the population average indirect causal effect.
Theorem 3 For any level 2 (0, 1), the interval
The next two theorems give finite sample confidence intervals for the population average total causal effect and for the population average overall causal effect, respectively. Theorem 4 For any level 2 (0, 1), the interval
Theorem 5 For any level 2 (0, 1), the interval
Þunder Assumption 1. Note that the confidence intervals C TE (, 0 , 1 , q, N), C OE (, 0 , 1 , q, N) and C IE (, 0 , 1 , q, N) use the same value * (, 0 , 1 , q, N), giving them identical length. Future work could improve on the length of these confidence intervals by a sharpening of the exponential inequalities used in their derivation 16 and by leveraging additional assumptions such as that of stratified interference or by deriving potentially sharper alternative exponential inequalities. In future work, we also plan to consider inference for continuous and possibly unbounded outcomes. The technical development necessary to achieve these results is beyond the scope of the current article and will be addressed elsewhere.
Towards inference in observational studies 5.1 What does standard inverse-probability-weighting estimate under interference?
In this section, we briefly consider an approach for drawing causal inferences from observational data in the presence of interference. We begin by noting that in the absence of (two-stage) randomisation, the estimators of Section 5 are no longer valid in an observational study. This is because Assumption 1 is in general no longer tenable in the non-experimental setting of an observational study, therefore, a different approach is needed. To make progress, we consider the following assumption:
. . , N, we assume that conditional on L i , the treatment allocation A i is independent of the counterfactual variables Y i (Á), that is:
where f AW L,i (a i W L i ) Pr{A i ¼ a i W L i } and L i are fixed pre-treatment variables observed on individuals in group i. This assumption is a group-level generalisation of the standard conditional randomisation assumption routinely made at the individual-level in the analysis of observational studies. Whereas the usual conditional randomisation assumption randomises each individual j 0 s exposure A ij in group i within levels of L ij , Assumption 3 states that the treatment allocation programme A i is randomly assigned to individuals in group i conditional on the vector of covariates L i observed on these individuals. Before we introduce our new inverse-probability-weighting methodology for making inferences under Assumption 3, it is instructive to consider what quantity is currently being estimated by standard inverse-probability-weighting when interference is incorrectly assumed not to be present. To be specific, under no-interference, if we had the analogue of (18) that
and if Pr {A ij ¼ 1W L ij } is known (or can be consistently estimated), and
then the average counterfactual for group i when all individuals are exposed to treatment a,
, can be unbiasedly estimated by the following inverse-probability-weighting estimator: 17
where the second equality follows by no-interference, i.e.
In the presence of interference, the second equality no longer holds, and it is straightforward to show the estimator T a,i becomes unbiased for the following quantity:
under Assumption 3. Thus, E(T a,i ) does not in general give an easily interpretable causal quantity (as a group average of counterfactuals), unless further assumptions are appropriate. Note for instance that if correlation among individuals within a group is null in the sense that:
which corresponds to an average of each individual's counterfactual sample average when only the individual's treatment is intervened upon. In the next section, we give inverse-probability-weighted estimators that always recover interpretable causal effects (direct, indirect, overall and total effects) without making additional assumptions about lack of correlation as above.
New inverse-probability-weighted estimators
Whereas in Section 5.1, the outcome was assumed to be binary, hereafter, no such assumption is needed. In addition to Assumption 3, we suppose that the following positivity assumption holds:
. . , N, we assume that conditional on L i , we have that for all a i 2 A(n i )
Assumption 4 is a group-level version of the positivity assumption routinely made at the individual level in the analysis of observation studies. In the appendix, we show that the following theorem holds: Theorem 6 Suppose that f AW L,i (ÁW L i ) satisfies Assumptions 3 and 4, and that 0 is the parametrisation of a Bernoulli individual group assignment strategy (i.e. a type B parametrisation) which satisfies Assumption 4; that is p i (a i ; 0 ) > 0 for all
According to this theorem, if the allocation probability mechanism f AW L (ÁW L i ) is known, the population counterfactual averages Y i a; 0 ð Þ and Y i 0 ð Þ are identified from the observed data, and the inverse-probability-weighted estimators b 
Þare usually not feasible in practice since it is usually the case in observational studies that f AW L (ÁW L i ) is unknown to the analyst. To proceed, we could estimate this unknown treatment allocation mechanism from observed data. Because L i will typically include a large vector of covariates, nonparametric estimation of f AW L (A i W L i ) is not a viable option, and parametric or semi-parametric models must be adopted in practice. Next, we provide a brief description of a practical parametric approach when the number of groups N is reasonably large. In such a setting, we propose to estimate a parsimonious model 
with respect to to give b : The mixed model paradigm is particularly appealing in the current setting, as it provides a flexible framework to account for a possible non-null conditional association between A ij and A ij 0 given L i , for j 6 ¼ j 0 . Furthermore, under the assumption that A i and A i 0 are independent given L i and L i 0 for i 6 ¼ i 0 , b is a maximum likelihood estimator (MLE), and thus, under standard regularity conditions it is ffiffiffiffi N p Àconsistent under the model. However, note that the mixed model is agnostic to a possible non-null conditional association between A ij and A i 0 j 0 for i 6 ¼ i 0 . Such a non-null association between the exposure levels of individuals belonging to different groups may arise say due to the spatial proximity of the two groups, even in the absence of between-group interference. In such a case, b is no longer the MLE, but will remain consistent as the number of groups grows to infinity, provided that the non-null association of exposure levels between groups is not too pervasive. Specifically, this will hold provided that the dependence between the treatment allocation programme of a given group is non-null only with that of a fixed number of groups. Feasible estimators of the various causal effects are then obtained by
A large sample estimator of the variances of the estimates of the various causal effects can be obtained under standard regularity assumptions using well-known Taylor series arguments that we do not reproduce here. The finite sample behaviour of these various estimators remains to be examined in a simulation study which we plan to undertake in future work.
An alternative approach
Thus far we have assumed that Y i (Á) is fixed; we will now briefly consider a setting in which Y i (Á) is considered random. Hong and Raudenbush 5 assume stratified interference (Assumption 2) and assume that Y ij (a i ) depends on a i,Àj only through some known many-to-one scalar function v(a i,Àj ) so that Y ij (a i ) can be written as Y ij (a ij , v(a i,Àj )). For example, v(a i,Àj ) might be the mean of a i,Àj . Suppose now that for all i, j, A ij is determined by unconditional randomisation then Assumption 3 will hold unconditionally and it will also be the case that:
Hong and Raudenbush 5 consider a variation on this assumption in the context of observational data. Specifically, they assume that:
and from this it follows that:
and from this one could obtain conditional direct, indirect and total effects, namely,
Hong and Raudenbush 5 also allow L ij to contain cluster level covariates along with cluster aggregates of individual level covariates. A similar approach is taken in VanderWeele 19 in the context of mediation in the presence of interference. Note, however, that (22) requires that Y ij (a ij , v) be mean independent of both A ij and v(a i,Àj ) conditional on L ij . If, for each individual A ij is randomised conditional on L ij , although this will imply that Y ij (a ij , v) is mean independent of A ij conditional on L ij , it does not necessarily guarantee that Y ij (a ij , v) is mean independent of v(a i,Àj ) conditional on L ij . More generally, instead of (21) we might consider
where h(L i ) is a known function of L i . However once again, with (23) , even if for each individual A ij were randomised conditional on L ij , h(L i ), this does not guarantee that Y ij (a ij , v) is mean independent of v(a i,Àj ) conditional on L ij , h(L i ) unless h(L i ) ¼ L i .
Varieties of direct and indirect effects
We have considered several types of effects that arise when there is interference between units.
We have considered the effect on some outcome of an individual's treatment when the treatment of other units in a cluster are held fixed at a certain value; following, Hudgens and Halloran, 6 this was referred to as a 'direct effect'. We have also considered the effect on an individual's outcome of holding the individual's own treatment fixed but modifying the treatments received by other individuals in the same cluster; again following Hudgens and Halloran, 6 this was referred to as an 'indirect effect'. Of course, the terms 'direct effects' and 'indirect effects' are also used in the context of questions of mediation analysis, that is in assessing the extent to which the effect of some treatment on an outcome is mediated through some intermediate (the indirect effect) and the extent to which it occurs through other pathways (the direct effect). In some contexts, both interference and mediation may be present and of interest and the terms 'direct effect' and 'indirect effect' become ambiguous as they may make reference to the concepts from interference or from mediation. In the infectious disease literature, the terminology of 'direct and indirect effects' when interference is present dates at least as far back as Halloran and Struchiner 8 although Hudgens and Halloran 6 arguably provide the first formal counterfactual definitions. The terminology of ''direct and indirect effects'' in the context of mediation analysis extends at least as far back as the literature on structural equation modelling 20 motivated by the method of path coefficients of Wright; 21 counterfactual notions of direct and indirect effects were described in detail by Holland 22 and Robins and Greenland. 23 Because of the potential ambiguity in terms 'direct effect' and 'indirect effect,' Sobel 4 chose to use the term 'spillover effect' for the effect on an individual's outcome of holding the individual's own treatment fixed but modifying the treatments received by other individuals. An early paper 24 in experimental educational psychology appears to have interchangeably used 'indirect effect' and 'spillover effect' to denote the effect on a child's outcome of holding the child's own treatment fixed but modifying the treatments received by other children. Complicating terminological issues yet further, the causal inference literature on mediation has itself produced alternative definitions of direct and indirect effects based on potential interventions on the mediator 23, 25 or alternatively on the notion of principal strata. 26, 27 Variants of the notions of direct and indirect effects based on principal strata may in fact further be reformulated in the context of interference. Consider a vaccine trial (type A randomisation) in which each cluster has two individuals so that for all i, n i ¼ 2 (e.g. a study of married households with no children) such that half of the households were randomised to no vaccine ( 0 ¼ 0) and half of the households were randomised to having one individual (e.g. the wife) vaccinated ( 1 ¼ 0.5). For each i, let j ¼ 1 denote the subject that is potentially vaccinated (e.g. the wife) and j ¼ 2 the subject that is never vaccinated (e.g. the husband). In the infectious disease context, a vaccination for individual 1 may prevent individual 2 from being infected either because the vaccine prevents individual 1 from being in infected or possibly because, even if individual 1 becomes infected, the vaccine itself renders the infection less contagious. A distinction between these two possibilities is sometimes drawn by using 'susceptibility effect' to describe the former and 'infectiousness effect' to describe the latter. 11 Consider the following causal quantity,
; this is the effect on individual 2 of vaccinating individual 1 (with individual 2 unvaccinated) amongst the subset of households for whom individual 1 becomes infected irrespective of whether individual 1 receives the vaccination; this would be a principal strata direct effect. 12, 27 If this quantity were non-zero we might interpret this as evidence of an ''infectiousness effect'' of the vaccine since the vaccination of individual 1 affects the outcome of individual 2 even though it has no effect on the outcome of individual 1. Future work could potentially adapt estimation methods for principal strata direct effects 28, 29 to attempt to estimate and potentially test for the presence of an 'infectiousness effect',
Note that although the infectiousness effect quantity defined above is a 'principal strata direct effect', within the context of interference it is a form of an 'indirect effect' since individual 2's vaccination status is fixed to be unvaccinated in the causal comparison. Within the context of interference, both the 'susceptibility effect' and the 'infectiousness effect' are in fact forms of 'indirect effects' (in the interference sense) because both the 'susceptibility effect' and the 'infectiousness effect' concern the effect on individual 2 of holding individual 2's vaccine status fixed but changing the vaccine status of individual 1; if interference were absent, neither of the effects would be present. If interference were absent then the principal strata 'infectiousness effect' quantity defined above would reduce to
Again terminology concerning 'direct and indirect effects' is ambiguous and is easily confused: what is a 'direct effect' in the context of principal strata is an 'indirect effect' in the context of interference.
Because of the multiple varieties of direct and indirect effects, the use of more specific terminology may be desirable. In the context of interference, 'indirect effect' and 'direct effect' could be replaced by 'spillover effect' and 'unit-treatment effect'; in the context of mediation, 'indirect effect' and 'direct effect' could be replaced by 'mediated effect' and 'unmediated effect'. Yet further caution with regard to terminology on direct and indirect effects will be needed when both interference and mediation are present and of interest. 19 
Concluding remarks
In this article we have reviewed some of the literature on causal inference in the presence of interference, we have provided new results on inference without the assumption of stratified interference and we have described an inverse probability weighting approach to causal inference under interference in the context of observational studies. Interference arises in settings in which social interactions are present including settings of infectious disease, the study of neighbourhoods and classrooms and in a variety of economic contexts. Although most work in causal inference has proceeded under a no-interference assumption, there are clearly many contexts in which such an assumption is not plausible. The issues raised by interference can be circumvented to a certain extent by implementing treatment programmes at the cluster level rather than the individual level. However, interference gives rise to spillover effects which are themselves of intrinsic interest and the analysis of such spillover effects is inaccessible without explicitly taking interference into account. Theory and methods to address questions of interference and spillover effects will thus likely be important for a number of applied research settings.
This study could be extended in a number of directions. Finite sample confidence intervals of shorter length than those in Section 4 could be obtained by employing additional assumptions such as stratified interference; continuous and unbounded outcomes could also be considered. The finite sample behaviour of the inverse probability weighting estimation approach we proposed in this article could be explored. Furthermore, Marginal Structural Models for the joint causal effects of individual and program level interventions could also be defined and estimated by appropriate inverse-probabilityweighting. Identification or partial identification results for the 'infectiousness effect', formalised in terms of principal strata, could be developed. Finally, further research could also potentially develop a more general framework for interference and spillover effects so as to consider a range of settings in which both interference and mediation were present and also so as to potentially allow for both withincluster and between-cluster forms of interference. Causal inference under interference is a relatively new subfield and considerable work remains to be carried out.
Proof of Lemma 1 Note that Varð b
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